報告題目: Alliance Formation Among Competitors
報告時間：2020年10月30日（星期五）19:00—20:30
報告地點：騰訊會議 ID：615 739 921
（會議鏈接：https://meeting.tencent.com/s/8JinxZ4c6wIg）
報告人：吳肖樂 復旦大學管理學院 教授
主講人簡介：
吳肖樂，復旦大學管理學院教授、博士生導師。2016年國家優秀青年科學基金項目獲得者，2020年國家杰出青年科學基金項目獲得者。2006年本科畢業于清華大學工業工程系，2011年博士畢業于圣路易斯華盛頓大學。主要研究供應鏈管理、風險管理、可持續性運營問題。其研究工作發表于Management Science, MSOM，POM 等頂級期刊。曾獲中國管理學青年獎（2017）、華人學者管理科學與工程協會最佳論文一等獎（2011）、2016 MSOM Meritorious Service Award等。入選上海市曙光人才計劃（2016）、上海市教育系統巾幗建功標兵（2020）。目前擔任頂級期刊POM 的Senior Editor、Service Science 和Modern Supply Chain Research and Applications 的Associate Editor。
Abstract：We study potential alliance formation among three competing firms with asymmetric capacity: one large firm has ample capacity, and two small firms have limited capacity. Each firm can either operate independently or form an alliance with another firm. Due to antitrust laws, an alliance of all three firms is not permitted. We first derive and compare equilibrium profits for different alliance structures in the base model where the size of loyal buyers for different firms is symmetric. By considering a standard equilibrium concept, we find that either no alliance will be formed or the large firm will form a ''mixed'' alliance with a small firm under conditions pertaining to the sizes of each firm’s capacity and loyal buyers. We explain how the equilibrium alliance structure is driven by the “price effect”and the “demand effect”. We also extend our base model to the case when the large firm has more loyal buyers than the small ones, and show that our structural results remain the same even though a ''small'' alliance with two small firms can emerge as the dominant alliance structure in some occasions.
